ABSTRACT
Introduction
The hypothesis of pure self-interest has been proved correct in many situations and has been highly useful in designing optimal incentive contracts. It is normal for the standard contract theory to assume that the agent maximizes his profit to the extent of his receipts minus the cost of private effort while the principal maximizes his wealth to the extent of profits generated by agents minus payments made to the agents. However, in recent years, a series of game experiments such as ultimatum game and dictator game [1] , trust game [2] , gift exchange game [3] and public good game [4] , have been proving that not all people are motivated exclusively by pure self-interest considerations, which are reviewed in [5] and [6] . Actually, many people are inequity averse and prefer more fair allocation. Both inequity aversion and self-interest preference affect behaviors, but sometimes their effects are not consistent. For example, people pursuing inequity aversion will sacrifice some of their own material payoffs in order to realize a more fair allocation while people pursuing pure self-interest won't. When the related material payoffs are relatively large, the inequity aversion is the dominating factor in deciding individual behavior, while in case of relatively small, the self-interest is the dominating. Some new theoretical models, such as [7, 8, 9] and [10] , have been developed to explain various experimental results by incorporating inequity aversion into the framework of utility maximization.
Then, how will the inequity aversion influence the optimal contract for multiple agents? This paper tries to design the optimal contract for multiple agents with inequity aversion and further examines the influence of inequity aversion on incentive efficiency in the approach of FS Model developed by [7] with the improvement of replacing the assumption of risk neutrality with risk aversion. The optimal contract under inequity aversion is found to be the joint contract by which payment to each independent agent must depend on both his own output and others', instead of the independent contract which is the optimal contract given by standard contract theory and pays each independent agent according to his own output. To be concrete, the optimal contract under relatively weak inequity aversion is the relative joint contract, by which payment to each independent agent increases with his own output and others' and agents with higher output will be paid more, while that that under strong, even very strong, inequity aversion is the egalitarian joint contract, by which payment to each independent agent is always equal and hence agents with lower output will not be paid less. Moreover, it is shown that the inequity aversion adds a new incentive constrain and surely results in incentive efficiency losses because agents with inequity aversion will suffer disutility in face of unfair allocation. As a result, the principal has to pay additional inequity rent and risk compensation for inequity aversion to the agents, which both are the incentive efficiency losses resulted from inequity aversion and have never been explored by the standard contract theory, besides information rent and risk compensation for asymmetric information, which both have been investigated deeply in the standard contract theory.
There are some existing related literatures. Two brief but good recent surveys are [11] and [12] . The optimal contract for multiple agents showing jealousy, which is one side of inequity aversion, is analyzed in [13] and [14] , while [15, 16, 17, 18, 19] and [20] studied the incentive contract when agents exhibit inequity aversion or some other forms of social preferences by restricting the class of contracts to linear schemes. Literature [15, 16] focused on the case of a single agent, while [17, 18, 19] and [20] examined that of multiple agents. Tournament amongst agents with inequity aversion is considered in [21] and [22] , while [23, 24] and [25] probed the influence of inequity aversion on team incentives. Furthermore, [26, 27] and [28] studied peer pressure, a special form of social preference similar to inequity aversion. As the most relevant literature, [29] established the optimal contract for multiple agents showing inequity aversion with assumption of risk neutrality and limited liability constraints, while this paper assumes that agents with inequity aversion are also risk averse and there is no limited liability constraint. Thus, some forms of contracts outlined by [29] , are unrealistic, while contracts offered in this paper are all practicable. Furthermore, [29] didn't investigate the influence of inequity aversion on incentive efficiency, while this paper analyzes it and concludes that inequity aversion results in incentive efficiency losses, including inequity rent and risk compensation for inequity aversion.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 briefly summarizes the theory of inequity aversion. Section 3 presents the basic model and Section 4 provides the solution. Section 5 analyzes the optimal joint contract. Section 6 studies the influence of inequity aversion on incentive efficiency. A numerical example is given in Section 7. Finally, Section 8 draws conclusion.
Theory of Inequity Aversion
A lot of game experiments and literatures argue that people often care about material payoffs of others, dislike unfair allocation, and reciprocate kind or unkind behaviors of others. Generally speaking, these behaviors are motivated by social preferences. There are two approaches to describe the social preferences: the distributional approach and the motivational approach, which are reviewed in [30] . The distributional approach, such as that of [7] and [8] , is concerned only with effects of actions on final allocations. It neglects intentions behind behaviors and solely focuses on final allocations but still fares well in explaining observed experimental results while remaining quite simple and tractable. The motivational approach, such as that of [9, 10, 31] and [32] , pays attention to the intentions behind behaviors and tries to actually model reciprocity, by which any friendly action will be returned and any spiteful action will be retaliated. It is certainly closer to a realistic modeling of human behavior, but is not analytically tractable. As one kind of the distributional approach, the theory of inequity aversion emphasizes preference for fair allocation. When his material payoff is below others', the agent suffers jealous disutility, while when his material payoff is above others', he suffers compassion disutility. The sum of disutility arising from jealousy and compassion is defined as inequity aversion disutility. The theory of inequity aversion, especially the FS Model proposed by [7] , is reasonable enough, simple and quite tractable. Therefore, it is widely accepted and applied. In this paper, we also adopt the FS Model, expressed by plies that the jealous disutility resulted from disadvantageous inequity is greater than the compassion disutility originated from advantageous inequity, while 0 1   i  implies that although the agent with inequity aversion suffers compassion disutility, he still prefers more. Particularly, 0
Although the FS Model solely focuses on the final allocation and ignores the behavioral intentions, it can explain almost all the experimental results and capture many reciprocal behaviors. Therefore, it is widely applied. However, it is based on the assumption of risk neutrality and, thus, is not practicable to some extent. For example, we usually feel more jealous when receiving a payment of 600 dollars while our colleagues receive 700 than when receiving 6000 while our colleagues receive 6100. But the FS Model supposes that we feel the same degree of jealousy and hereby suffer the same jealous disutility in the above two cases, which is obviously not in accordance with normal feelings. Consequently, in this paper, we improve the FS Model and suppose that in order to judge whether the allocation is fair or not, each agent compares the utility derived from his payment with others' in the reference group one by one, instead of directly comparing the payment, which is the assumption of the FS Model. In this way, the revised FS Model, which is based on risk aversion, can be denoted as
where represents the utility of , derived from his payment , and illustrates the utility of , derived from his payment .
j
It is clear that the revised FS model is more practicable than the FS Model because the agent surely suffers more jealous disutility when he receives a payment of 600 dollars while his colleagues receive 700 than when he receives 6000 while his colleagues receive 6100, which is in accordance with normal feelings. Furthermore, the revised model is more general than the FS Model. In fact, the FS Model is a special case of the revised model.
The Basic Model
The following models the interaction between a risk neutral, pure self-interest, profit maximizing principal and two symmetric risk averse, utility maximizing agents A and B, who are inequity averse towards each other and engage in Task . The reservation utility of each agent is supposed to be zero. The timing of the game is as follows. First, the principal offers a contract to the agents. Second, the agents decide whether to accept or reject the contract. If the contract is rejected, the game ends and each agent receives zero, the reservation utility. Third, after accepting the contract, the agents exert efforts simultaneously. Finally, the outputs of the tasks are realized and the transfers are made.
The contract is represented by , in which
denotes the payment to  ( i and denotes the payment to by the contract, when the output of i is and the output of is . If , it is an independent contract, by which the payment to each agent depends on only his own output. On the contrary, if al ah , it is a joint contract, by which the payment to each agent depends on both his own output and others' output. 
where
represents the utility of one agent (A or B) derived from his payment, illustrates that of the other agent, and
is the cost of effort and
If both A and B make high effort, the expected utility of each agent, derived from the payment, is And the expected inequity aversion disutility of each agent can be represented by
So, the expected utility of each agent can be denoted as 
And the expected inequity aversion disutility of can be represented by
So, the expected utility of the agent who makes low effort while the other makes high effort can be denoted as is the expected inequity aversion disutility.
The principal designs the optimal contract subject to the participation constraint and the incentive compatibility constraint to maximize the expected profit, which is illustrated as
where PC denotes the participation constraint and IC illustrates the incentive compatibility constraint. The next section solves [P1], and hereby derives the optimal contract for multiple agents with inequity aversion.
Solutions to the Model
In order to solve [P1] , and obtain the optimal contract, the following lemma is necessary, where a contract is feasible if it satisfies the participation constraint and the incentive compatibility constraint. (4), (5), (6), PC and , the participation constraint for contract can be denoted as
From (4), (5), (6), (7), (8), (9), IC and , the incentive compatibility constraint for contract can be represented by
The expected payment to each agent by contract is
Contract is defined by , , and . Obviously, it satisfies , and the expected payment to each agent by contract equals that by contract . Therefore, if contract is feasible, the lemma is proved. From (4), (5), (6), PC and , the participation constraint for contract is (1 ) ( )
According to the definition of contract and (10), it is clear that (13) holds. Thus, contract satisfies the participation constraint. And from (4), (5), (6) , (7), (8), (9) , IC and , the incentive compatibility constraint for contract can be denoted as
which by the definition of contract is equivalent to which by the definition of contract is equivalent to
Subtracting the left-hand side of (11) from the left-hand side of (15), . The right-hand side of (11) is the same as the right-hand side of (15) . Then, (14) holds. Therefore, contract W satisfies the incentive compatibility constraint also and hereby is feasible. 
Q.E.D.
By the above lemma, the optimal contract satisfies . 
which is a standard problem of convex programming. It is easy to achieve the solution
where  is the Lagrangian multiplier of PC,  is that of IC, and
. Here, because . Then, the above (17) equals
Consequently, the solution to [P1], or the optimal contract for independent agents A and B with inequity aversion,
, is defined by (18) and (19).
The Joint Contracts
In case of 0     , by (18) , . Furthermore, from (19) , and , by which the optimal contract for multiple independent pure self-interest agents is the independent contract and the payment to each agent depends on only his own output. This is the sufficient statistics result revealed by [33] and [34] in the standard contract theory.
, by (17) , (18) and ,
From (20) , by which the optimal contract for multiple independent agents with inequity aversion is the joint contract, and the payment to each agent depends on, and further increases with, both his own output and others' output. Therefore, the sufficient statistics result of the standard contract theory does not work in the optimal contract for agents with inequity aversion. The result that the payment to an independent agent should depend on both his own output and others' is not novel. It appears in the rank order tournament [35] and the rank-order contract [36] . But what this paper exploring is the optimal contract for multiple risk averse agents with inequity aversion, while as pointed out by [33] , the rank order tournament is not the optimal contract even for multiple risk averse agents with pure self-interest. (19) and (20) , it is easy to find that if inequity aversion is strong enough to satisfy
there must be . And by the above lemma, always holds. So, for the inequity aversion stronger than that defined by (21) , . The joint contract satisfying is defined as egalitarian joint contract , by which the payment to each independent agent is always equal, no matter what output each agent achieves. On the other hand, when inequity aversion is weaker than that defined by (21), we can obtain from (18), (19) and (20) . The joint contract that satisfies is defined as relative joint contract , by which the payment to each independent agent should rest with, and further increase with, both his own output and others' output. Integrating the above two aspects, the following proposition can be obtained.
The optimal contract under relatively weak inequity aversion is the relative joint contract, while that under strong, even very strong inequity aversion is the egalitarian joint contract.
The relative joint contract is denoted as, which is defined by (18) and (19) . And the egalitarian joint contract can be represented by , which is the solution to the following [P4] . When the intensity of inequity aversion equals, or bigger than that defined by (21) , from (18), (19) and (20) 
The solution can be represented by
where '
 is the Lagrangian multiplier of PC while '  is that of IC.
Obviously, different from the relative joint contract, the egalitarian joint contract is not correlative to the intensity of inequity aversion, although it is the optimal contract under inequity aversion stronger than that of (21).
Incentive Efficiency Losses
In order to analyze the incentive efficiency losses resulting from inequity aversion clearly, the agency cost of joint contract, which is the optimal contract under inequity aversion is compared with that of independent contract, which is the optimal contract under pure self-interest. If the agency cost of joint contract is higher, the difference is the incentive efficiency losses resulting from inequity aversion. On the contrary, if the agency cost of joint contract is lower, the difference is the incentive efficiency gains stemmed from inequity aversion. This is an easy way to measure the influence of inequity aver-sion on incentive efficiency.
Case of Relative Joint Contract
From (19) , the payment to each agent by the relative joint contract is
And from (3) and (19) , the utility of each agent, excluding cost of effort, in every case, is 
where when each agent achieves the same output, each agent only obtains the utility derived from the payment, while when the output of each agent is unequal, that is, one agent such as A achieves high output while B achieves low output, A suffers additional compassion disutility and B suffers additional jealous disutility, excepting the utility derived from the payment.
On one hand, in order to endow the pure self-interest agent with the same utility as of (24) in every case, the expected payment that the principal has to make is
From (23), (25) and , it is clear that the principal has to make higher expected payment to the agent with inequity aversion than that to the pure self-interest agent in order to endow them with the same utility in every case. The extra payment, defined as inequity rent, is caused by inequity aversion and is the compensation for the inequity disutility resulting from unfair allocation. From (23) and (25), the inequity rent can be represented by
On the other hand, in order to endow the pure self-interest agent with the same utility as of (24) in every case by the independent contract, the optimal contract for pure self-interest agent offered by the standard contract theory, the expected payment the principal has to make is 
The agency cost by the egalitarian joint contract equals the sum of the above risk compensation for inequity aversion and the risk compensation for asymmetric information.
Integrating the above analysis, it is clear that the agency cost increases with the intensity of inequity aversion within an upper limit defined by (40). By the egalitarian joint contract, even agents with inequity aversion don't suffer any inequity disutility, and the principal only need pay the fixed and hereby limited risk compensation for inequity aversion. However, by the relative joint contract, agents with inequity aversion suffer inequity disutility in face of unfair allocation, and the principal has to pay inequity rent, besides the risk compensation for inequity aversion. Whether the egalitarian joint contract or the relative joint contract is optimal depends on their respective agency costs. The one with lower agency costs is optimal. In case of relatively weak inequity aversion, agency cost of the relative joint contract is less and, therefore, it is the optimal, while in case of strong, even very strong inequity aversion, agency cost of the egali-tarian joint contract is smaller and, hence, it is the optimal.
A Numerical Example
In order to explain the above theoretical analysis clearly and fix ideas easily, the following offers a numerical example. The agent can achieve high output H x with probability of if he takes high effort H , while with probability of 
Extreme Case: Infinite Inequity Aversion
The above theoretical analysis has found that when inequity aversion is strong enough, the optimal contract is the egalitarian joint contract, by which payment to each independent agent is always equal, no matter what output each agent achieves. In order to illustrate it, the following four extreme cases, ( 10, Table 1 .
From Table 1 , the following conclusions can be drawn. (1) The optimal contract under weak inequity aversion is the relative joint contract, and trends towards the egalitarian joint contract as the intensity of inequity aversion increases. (2) Pure self-interest only requires risk compensation for asymmetric information, while inequity aversion results in inequity aversion losses, which increase with the intensity of inequity aversion within an upper limit. (3) Risk compensation for asymmetric information under pure self-interest is the same as that under inequity aversion because it arises from asymmet- Under pure self-interest represented by point O, the optimal contract is the independent contract, and the agency cost includes only the risk compensation for asymmetric information. Under inequity aversion weaker than that of point S, the optimal contract is the relative joint contract, and the agency cost includes both the risk compensation for asymmetric information and inequity aversion losses, which increase with intensity of inequity aversion. Under inequity aversion stronger than that of point S, the optimal contract is the egalitarian joint contract and the agency cost includes both risk compensation for asymmetric information and inequity aversion compensation, which doesn't increase with the intensity of inequity aversion any more.
Concluding Remarks
The above designs the optimal contract for multiple agents with inequity aversion and then analyzes the incentive efficiency losses resulting from inequity aversion. Incorporating inequity aversion into optimal contract design can improve our understanding of the real world incentives. If agents exhibit an aversion towards unfair allocations, the optimal contract is the joint contract by which payment to each independent agent depends on both his own output and others'. The optimal contract under relatively weak inequity aversion is the relative joint contract by which payment to each independent agent increases with both his own output and others', while that under strong, even very strong, inequity aversion is the egalitarian joint contract by which payment to each independent agent is always equal, no matter how many outputs an agent achieves independently. While the optimal contract designed in the standard contract theory balances insurance and incentives, the joint contract incorporating inequity aversion balances insurance, incentives and fairness. Therefore, the inequity aversion adds an additional incentive constraint because the principal has to pay inequity rent and risk compensation for inequity aversion by the joint contract besides risk compensation for asymmetric information by the independent contract investigated in the standard contract theory.
So, the inequity aversion results in incentive efficiency losses, which include inequity rent and risk compensation for inequity aversion, increase with the intensity of inequity aversion by the relative joint contract, while only include risk compensation for inequity aversion, is fixed and hereby is limited by the egalitarian joint contract. Therefore, in order to design the optimal contract for agents with inequity aversion, whether the relative joint contract or the egalitarian joint contract, the principal must screen and evaluate the intensity of inequity aversion. In this way, some new theoretical insights are obtained by incorporating inequity aversion into the standard frame of optimal contract design and hence real economic behaviors can be explained more properly.
However, there remain many open questions to be answered. Firstly, how to measure the intensity of inequity aversion? There are few economic literatures that discuss evaluation and screening of inequity aversion. Secondly, how to change the preferences of the agents on behalf of the principal? To be more frank, how can an employer change the intensity of inequity aversion of his employees? Although most activities of human resource management are targeted at shaping preferences of employees, there are few concrete feasible solutions available. Finally, what is the scope of the reference group? What is the time horizon? The right framing of social comparison is surely another important task. All these questions are worth exploring further.
